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1. Introduction 
It is a truism that Africa is the continent most plagued by armed conflicts and 
that the Great Lakes area (broadly defined)1 is the most conflictual among the Af-
rican sub-regions. The Great Lakes have also witnessed the most horrendous post-
Cold War humanitarian disaster, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, which shocked the 
conscience of the entire world and of Africans in particular. According to the In-
ternational Panel of Eminent Personalities appointed by the Organization of Afri-
can Unity (OAU), “the end of the genocide [...] was the opening of an entirely new 
chapter, almost as appalling as the first, but enveloping the entire Great Lakes Re-
gion in brutal conflict before becoming a war that has directly or indirectly in-
volved governments and armies from every part of the continent”.2 The Interna-
tional Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) was conceived in response 
to these events with the objective of transforming the tormented area into “a space 
of durable peace and security, of political and social stability, and of economic 
growth and shared development by multi-sector cooperation and integration”.3 
The purpose, thus, was not just the abandonment of the aggressive use of armed 
force in the sub-region, but also the pursuit of economic development and the im-
provement of the living conditions of the populations.4  
                                                        
*
  PhD, University of Rome “La Sapienza”; Reader in International Law, School of Law, Univer-
sity of Westminster <mroscini@iol.it>. This article is based on developments as of 30 September 2009 
and all websites were also last visited on that date. 
1
  This article will refer to the Great Lakes Region as including the eleven core countries of the 
Great Lakes Pact. 
2
  International Panel of Eminent Personalities, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, para. 20.1, 
available at <www.africa-union.org/Official_documents/reports/Report_rwanda_genocide.pdf>. 
3
  Preamble, Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, Nairobi, 14-
15 December 2006. The text of the Pact, Protocols and Programmes of Action can be read at 
<www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/projects/greatlakes/ihl-greatlakes-summary-new-docmt.htm> . 
4
  M.R. Rupiya, Assessing the Stability Pact for the Great Lakes Region, 13 African Security Re-
view (2004), 127. 
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In 1996, the process gained momentum after the outbreak of the armed conflict 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and, in January 2000, the UN 
appointed a Special Representative to the Great Lakes Region with the task of sup-
porting the efforts of holding a conference that would not only try to resolve exist-
ing conflicts but also provide a legal and political basis for preventing new ones. 
Canada and the Netherlands joined the process and formed and co-chaired the 
Group of Friends of the Great Lakes Region, that worked with the UN and the 
African Union (AU) and financially, technically and politically supported the ef-
forts. The preparatory process of the Conference was officially launched when the 
national coordinators of the initial core countries (Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, 
Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Zambia) met for the first time in Nairobi on 23-24 June 
2003 and identified four core areas for intervention: Peace and Security, Economic 
Development and Regional Integration, Democracy and Good Governance, and 
Humanitarian and Social Issues. The first Summit of the Heads of State and gov-
ernment of the participating countries took place in Dar-es-Salaam on 19-20 No-
vember 2004 and led to the signing of the Declaration on Peace, Democracy, Secu-
rity and Development, which would constitute part and parcel of the final Pact. In 
February 2005 in Kigali, the participating States mandated thematic task forces to 
prepare action plans, programmes, projects and protocols on the four thematic ar-
eas in order to implement the Declaration.5 The Pact on Security, Stability and De-
velopment in the Great Lakes Region, which, apart from the main treaty, also 
comprises the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration, ten Protocols, four Programmes of Ac-
tion and a set of implementing mechanisms and institutions, was eventually signed 
at the second Summit in Nairobi (15 December 2006) by the now eleven core 
countries (Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Republic of Congo, 
DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia).6 By ratifying the 
Pact, the member States agree to apply all its elements according to the principle of 
non-selectivity, as the Pact, Protocols and Programmes are complementary and 
mutually reinforcing (Article 31 (1) of the Pact): in particular, the Programmes of 
Action support the implementation of the Protocols, while the Pact provides the 
legally binding framework of the whole regime.7 That is why the entry into force 
                                                        
5
  The Protocols were individually drafted before the Pact (C. Beyani, Introductory Note on the 
Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, 46 (1) International Legal Ma-
terials (2007), 173). 
6
  The Protocols are: the Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons; 
the Protocol on the Property Rights of Returning Persons; the Protocol on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity and all Forms of Dis-
crimination; the Protocol on the Prevention and Suppression of Sexual Violence Against Women and 
Children; the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance; the Protocol on Judicial Cooperation; 
the Protocol on Non-aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region; the Protocol on 
Management of Information and Communication; the Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of 
Natural Resources; and the Protocol on the Specific Reconstruction and Development Zone. The Pro-
grammes of Action focus on Peace and Security, Promotion of Democracy and Good Governance, 
Economic Development and Regional Integration, and Humanitarian and Social Issues. 
7
  Accordingly, the Pact and its components do not allow reservations (Art. 31 (2) of the Pact). 
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of the Pact, which occurred on 21 June 2008 (i.e., thirty days after the receipt by 
the Conference Secretariat of the eighth instrument of ratification),8 entailed the 
simultaneous entry into force of the Protocols. The Pact also sets up a sub-regional 
organization (the ICGLR) charged with the coordination and implementation of 
the Protocols and Programmes. The headquarters of the Secretariat are located in 
Bujumbura, Burundi. 
This article will focus on the ius ad bellum provisions contained in the Protocol 
on Non-aggression and Mutual Defence (hereinafter “Great Lakes Protocol”), 
which forms an integral part of the Great Lakes Pact. This Protocol contains pecu-
liar provisions that provide the opportunity to develop broader considerations on 
the alleged African unorthodox approach to the regulation of the use of armed 
force. Indeed, the Protocol cannot be considered in isolation and will thus be ana-
lyzed taking into account other analogous African treaties, with the ultimate pur-
pose of establishing whether or not its provisions are consistent with existing law. 
The following section deals with the prohibition of aggression and compares the 
definition contained in the Great Lakes Protocol with that adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in 1974. Section 3 analyzes the right of individual and collective 
self-defence as contained in the Protocol and discusses its consistency with Article 
51 of the UN Charter and customary international law. Finally, the last two sec-
tions investigate whether and under what conditions the Protocol provides for fur-
ther exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force in addition to self-defence, in 
particular the “responsibility to protect” populations by military means and the 
right of pro-democratic intervention. 
2. The Definition of Aggression 
The Great Lakes Protocol has two natures: it is both a non-aggression and a mu-
tual defence pact. As to the former aspect, one might wonder why the Great Lakes 
States decided to include the prohibition of aggression in a sub-regional treaty, 
considering that this prohibition is already well established under existing law and 
has even attained ius cogens status.9 There are several reasons for this. First, the Af-
rican Union (AU) encourages “the conclusion and ratification of non-aggression 
pacts between and among African States” and the harmonization of such agree-
ments.10 Second, the reaffirmation of the prohibition has a political value: it works 
                                                        
 
8
  Article 33 (1) of the Pact. In Res. 1823 (10 July 2008), the UN Security Council welcomed the 
entry into force of the Pact and stressed the importance of its full implementation. 
 
9
  This is the opinion of R. Ago, Eighth Report on State Responsibility, ILC Yearbook (1980-II, 
pt. 1), 44; R. Müllerson, Jus ad bellum: Plus Ça Change (Le Monde) Plus C’Est la Même Chose (Le 
Droit)?, 7 Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2002), 169; and N. Ronzitti, Diritto internazionale 
dei conflitti armati, Torino 2006, 33. 
10
  Chapter III, para. 13 (t) of the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security 
Policy, adopted in Sirte by the Second Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly (27-28 February 
2004), available at <www.africa-union.org/Official_documents/Decisions_Declarations/Sirte/ 
Declaration%20on%20a%20Comm.Af%20Def%20Sec.pdf>. 
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as a potent reminder in a region severely affected by interventionism and stigma-
tizes the wrongdoing States as “aggressors”.11 Finally, as will be seen, the drafters 
aimed to extend the prohibited conduct through the adoption of a definition of ag-
gression which is much broader than the traditional one. 
Article 5 of the Great Lakes Protocol provides that member States have a duty 
to refrain from acts of aggression, which are punishable also individually as inter-
national crimes against peace. The obligation is not limited to the relations among 
member States. Not only acts, but also threats of aggression and any propaganda 
related to such acts or threats are prohibited. Threats of aggression are not defined 
in the Great Lakes Protocol, but the 2005 AU Non-aggression and Common De-
fence Pact, which the Protocol under examination recalls in several instances, de-
scribes them as “any harmful conduct or statement by a State, group of States, or-
ganization of States, or non-State actor(s) which though falling short of a declara-
tion of war, might lead to an act of aggression as defined above” (Article 1 (w)).12 
But what exactly amounts to aggression? Article 5 (1) refers to Article 1 (2) and 
(3) of the Protocol itself, that contain a general definition of aggression and a list of 
situations amounting to aggression. At a closer look, however, the Protocol con-
tains another definition of aggression in Article 5 (2), according to which “[a]ny 
use or threat of the use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and po-
litical independence of a State, contrary to Article 4, or in any manner not author-
ized by the Charter of the United Nations and the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union, shall amount to an act of aggression”. This definition is not identical to that 
contained in Article 1 (2) and its inclusion is difficult to make sense of. Be that as it 
may, for the purposes of the duty to refrain from acts and threats of aggression, 
Article 5 (1) expressly refers to the definition contained in Article 1, which will 
thus be analyzed in the following pages. 
Article 1 (2) of the Great Lakes Protocol defines aggression as “the use, inten-
tionally and knowingly, of armed force or any hostile act, as referred to in Article 
1(3)(g to k), perpetrated by a State, a group of States, an organization of States or 
an armed group or by any foreign or external entity, against the sovereignty, po-
litical independence, territorial integrity and human security of the population of a 
Member State, contrary to the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the African 
Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact or the Charter of the United 
Nations”. This definition is modeled on that contained in Article 1 (c) of the AU 
Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact, which the Great Lakes Protocol re-
produces almost verbatim. The AU definition, as to it, is inspired by the well-
known Definition of Aggression adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1974.13 
                                                        
11
  Obviously, the UN Security Council would not be bound by such determination. 
12
  On the definition of “threat of the use of force”, see M. Roscini, Threats of Armed Force and 
Contemporary International Law, 54 Netherlands International Law Review (2007), 234-243. 
13
  GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974. Other African security treaties, e.g. the 1981 Eco-
nomic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance in De-
fence (Art. 1), the 2000 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) Mutual Assistance 
Pact (Art. 1) and the 2004 Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC) Non-aggression 
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Nevertheless, there are several important differences between the Great Lakes Pro-
tocol on the one hand and the General Assembly Definition on the other.14 First of 
all, while according to Article 1 of the latter the use of force must be carried out by 
a State, the Great Lakes Protocol also includes acts perpetrated by “a group of 
States, an organization of States or an armed group or by any foreign or external 
entity”.15 Therefore, aggression can be perpetrated not only by States individually 
or collectively, but also by non-State actors.16 This reflects the fact that militias and 
armed groups like the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), Bu-
rundi’s Palipehutu – Forces nationales de libération (FNL) and Uganda’s Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) have thrived in the Great Lakes Region due to the inca-
pacity of the governments to exercise effective control over certain parts of their 
territory and have threatened the stability of the individual Great Lakes States and 
of the region as a whole.17 In fact, some regional conflicts, like the one in the DRC, 
have only marginally engaged regular forces and mainly involved insurgent groups, 
with different degrees of external support.18 
Another difference is the fact that, in the Great Lakes Protocol, the use of armed 
force or other hostile acts must be directed against the sovereignty, political inde-
pendence, territorial integrity and human security of the population of a member 
State, which seems to suggest that the criteria are cumulative and not alternative as 
in the 1974 Definition.19 This is probably an oversight, that might however lead to 
                                                                                                                                              
Pact (Art. 1), contain definitions of aggression that reproduce almost verbatim Art. 1 of the General 
Assembly Definition. No definition appears in the 1978 ECOWAS Protocol on Non-aggression. 
14
  A minor difference is the fact that, in the Great Lakes Protocol, the use of armed force or any 
other hostile act must be contrary not only to the UN Charter, but also to the AU Constitutive Act or 
the AU Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact. This is obviously due to the fact that the Great 
Lakes treaty regime inserts itself in the pan-African collective security and institutional framework. It 
is interesting, however, that this final part of the definition is not preceded by the disjunction “or” as 
in Art. 2 (4) of the UN Charter, which literally means that it is not a safety clause prohibiting all other 
acts inconsistent with the above mentioned treaties, but that the acts must be contrary to those treaties 
in order to amount to aggression. This might however be an oversight. 
15
  It is to be noted that an explanatory note to Art. 1 of the 1974 Definition of Aggression provides 
that “the term ‘State’ […] [i]ncludes the concept of a ‘group of States’ where appropriate”. 
16
  “Armed groups” are defined in Art. 1 as “any armed group that do not belong to, or are not of-
ficially incorporated into, the defence and security forces of Member States”. On armed attacks carried 
out by non-State actors, see below, Section 3. 
17
  The Security Council has expressed concern and adopted sanctions against armed groups operat-
ing in the Great Lakes Region in several resolutions, e.g. Resolutions 1649 (21 December 2005) 1698 
(31 July 2006), 1653 (27 January 2006), 1804 (13 March 2008), 1807 (31 March 2008), 1857 (22 Decem-
ber 2008). 
18
  It appears that more than twenty armed groups have taken part in the conflict in the DRC after 
1994, the main ones controlling over fifty per cent of the country’s territory. See the Report on the 
situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo submitted by the Special Rappor-
teur Roberto Garretón in accordance with Commission of Human Rights Resolution 2000/15, 
E/CN.4/2001/40 (1 February 2001), 13, 49, available at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ 
GEN/G01/108/37/PDF/G0110837.pdf?OpenElement>. 
19
  According to Art. 1 of the General Assembly Definition, “[a]ggression is the use of armed force 
by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in 
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too restrictive interpretations. What is more interesting is that, like the AU Non-
aggression and Common Defence Pact, the Great Lakes Protocol adds “human se-
curity of the population of a Member State” to the list of interests against which an 
aggression can be directed. “Human security” is not defined in the Protocol but is 
at the core of the Project on the Development of Border Zones and Promotion of 
Human Security, also part of the Great Lakes Pact. The concept of “human secu-
rity” was first conceived in the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP)’s Human Development Report 1994 on “New Dimensions of Human 
Security”.20 The basic idea is that “there is no secure state with insecure people liv-
ing in it”.21 If traditional security has been identified with defending the State 
against external threats, the new concept makes the individual the entity to be se-
cured and recognizes that the greatest threats to security come from internal con-
flicts, diseases, hunger, environmental disasters, and not from inter-State wars. 
However, human security remains “a concept that has no clear theoretical ground-
ing, scant political precedent, no consensus-commanding definition, and a highly 
uncertain future”.22 Two schools of thought have emerged. The broader view, 
adopted in the UNDP Report, links human security to development and environ-
ment and argues that the notion refers not only to “protection from sudden and 
hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life” such as violent threats or natural 
disasters, but also to safety from chronic threats like hunger, disease and repression 
(“freedom from fear and want”).23 This view is based on the assumption that hun-
ger, diseases, environmental degradation kill more than wars and any realistic con-
cept of “security” should take this fact into account. The proponents of the nar-
rower view claim that such a broad approach renders the notion meaningless24 and 
                                                                                                                                              
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition” 
(emphasis added). 
20
  Read the Report at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/chapters>. 
21
  G. Oberleitner, Human Security: A Challenge to International Law?, 11 Global Governance 
(2005), 190. 
22
  T. Owen, Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a 
Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition, 35 Security Dialogue (2004), 374. Not many legal com-
mentators have engaged in the study of this notion (see, e.g., B. von Tigerstrom, Human Security and 
International Law: Prospects and Problems, Oxford 2008). 
23
  UNDP Report, above note 20, 23. The UNDP lists seven non-exhaustive categories of threats to 
human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal se-
curity, community security and political security (ibid., 24-25). The UN has embraced the notion of 
human security in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document qualifying it as “freedom from fear 
and want”, where “fear” refers to security and “want” to development, and has pledged to discuss and 
define it (GA Res. 60/1 (24 October 2005), para. 143). The concept also permeates the UN Secretary-
General’s 2000 Millennium Report (<www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/full.htm>), the UN Secre-
tary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’s Report “A More Secure World: 
Our Shared Responsibility” (UN Doc. A/59/565 (2 December 2004)), and the 2005 Report “In Larger 
Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All” (UN Doc. A/59/2005, 21 
March 2005). 
24
  K. Krause, Is Human Security “More than Just a Good Idea?”, in: M. Brzoska and P.J. Croll 
(eds.), Promoting Security: But How and for Whom?, Bonn International Center for Conversion (Oc-
tober 2004), 44 (<www.bicc.de/uploads/pdf/publications/briefs/brief30/brief30.pdf>). According to 
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suggest that human security should be limited to protection from violent threats 
(“freedom from fear”) and should focus only on the human consequences of (espe-
cially internal) armed conflicts, State failure, repressive governments.25 The Great 
Lakes Protocol does not expressly adopt either approach. However, the document 
by which it is largely inspired – the AU Non-aggression and Common Defence 
Pact – embraces the broader notion of “human security” by defining it as “the se-
curity of the individual in terms of satisfaction of his/her basic needs. It also in-
cludes the creation of social, economic, political, environmental and cultural condi-
tions necessary for the survival and dignity of the individual, the protection of and 
respect for human rights, good governance and the guarantee for each individual of 
opportunities and choices for his/her full development” (Article 1 (k)). The Solemn 
Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy, adopted by the 
African Heads of State and government in Sirte on 28 February 2004, also specifies 
that human security is based “not only on political values but on social and eco-
nomic imperatives as well”; therefore, a modern concept of security includes “hu-
man rights; the right to participate fully in the process of governance; the right to 
equal development as well as the right to have access to resources and the basic ne-
cessities of life; the right to protection against poverty; the right to conducive edu-
cation and health conditions; the right to protection against marginalization on the 
basis of gender; protection against natural disasters, as well as ecological and envi-
ronmental degradation”.26  
The reasons for this expansive approach to the concept of “human security” lie 
in the pathological weakness of the African State as an institution27 and its incapac-
ity to entirely control its territory, as well as in the pandemic corruption of the 
governing élites: focusing on traditional “State security” would often mean provid-
ing protection to greedy governments, criminals and warlords.28 It is also to be 
noted that it is non-military threats to human security, such as scarcity and deple-
tion of natural resources, that have fuelled most, if not all, African conflicts. None-
                                                                                                                                              
another commentator, “[i]f the term ‘human security’ embraces almost all forms of harm to individu-
als – from affronts to dignity to genocide – it loses any real descriptive power” (A. Mack, A Signifier 
of Shared Values, 35 Security Dialogue (2004), 367). 
25
  See Mack, above note 24, 366-367, and, more broadly, Human Security Centre, The Human Se-
curity Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century, New York-Oxford 2005. 
26
  Chapter I, para. 6. 
27
  It is well-known that the very notion of “State” was introduced to Africa by the Europeans and 
that many African States are the artificial creation of colonial powers and Cold War rivalry (J. Cilliers, 
Human Security in Africa – A Conceptual Framework for Review, African Human Security Initiative 
2004, 20, available at <www.africanreview.org/docs/humsecjun04.pdf>). 
28
  It has been argued that “[l]eaders, acting in the name of national security, have often directly 
posed profound threats to human security, or, as is the case in a number of African countries, simply 
abdicated their responsibility and used state security resources to pursue personal or partisan objec-
tives” (Cilliers, above note 27, 39). The 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework makes clear 
that “the tensions between sovereignty and supranationality, and between regime security and human 
security, shall be progressively resolved in favor of supranationality and human security respectively” 
(Regulation MSC/REG.1/01/08, 16 January 2008, para. 4, available at <www.ecowas.int/publications/ 
en/framework/ECPF_final.pdf>). 
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theless, including human security in the definition of aggression appears redundant 
and mainly emphatic. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the external uses of force 
and hostile acts listed in Article 1 (3) of the Great Lakes Protocol could be against 
human security without also being against the sovereignty, political independence 
and territorial integrity of the State where the population is located. Furthermore, 
although it has been argued that “human security is interventionist by nature”,29 
the present author suggests that extreme caution should be used when extending a 
broad and indistinct concept to the rules on the use of armed force. 
The Great Lakes Protocol’s definition of aggression also incorporates a mental 
element: the wrongdoer must carry out the prohibited conduct “intentionally and 
knowingly”. This subjective element does not expressly appear in Article 1 of the 
General Assembly Definition, but its relevance has been indirectly recognized in 
Article 2, where it states that, apart from the first use of armed force, the Security 
Council may take “other relevant circumstances” into account when determining 
the existence of an act of aggression.30 The relevance of the mental element is sup-
ported by Cassese, who argues that “in the case of aggression, it would seem that a 
claimant State should prove that the State’s officials that planned and unleased ag-
gression had the animus aggressionis, that is, they intended to invade and conquer 
foreign territory, or destroy the foreign State apparatus, and so on”.31 The express 
reference to intent and knowledge in the Great Lakes Protocol’s definition might 
be due to the fact that the Protocol also qualifies aggression as a crime against 
peace entailing individual criminal responsibility (Articles 3 (4) and 5 (3)). It is also 
to be noted that, in the General Assembly Definition, intent is only one of the cir-
cumstances that the Security Council can take into account when determining 
whether an act amounts to aggression: among other relevant circumstances is the 
fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are “of sufficient gravity” (Arti-
cle 2). In the Great Lakes Protocol, this de minimis clause is not present. 
Once again in contrast with the 1974 Definition, the Great Lakes Protocol’s 
definition of aggression distinguishes two types of acts: uses of armed force and 
other hostile acts, listed in Article 1 (3) (a-f) and (g-k), respectively. It is not clear 
whether the list is exhaustive or not. Article 4 of the General Assembly Definition 
expressly states that further acts can be added: the absence of a similar clause in the 
Great Lakes Protocol suggests that the list contained therein is exhaustive. How-
ever, the fact that Article 5 (2) equates any use or threat of the use of force to an act 
of aggression seems to support the opposite view. Be that as it may, the first seven 
cases of aggression listed in Article 1 (3) (all the uses of force and the first type of 
hostile act) mirror their counterparts in the General Assembly Definition with pe-
                                                        
29
  Oberleitner, above note 21, 194. 
30
  Para. 2 was added as a compromise between those States maintaining that intent was an essential 
element of aggression and those who argued that only due regard had to be given to it, as the first use 
of armed force would suffice (J. Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71 
AJIL (1977), 228-230). 
31
  A. Cassese, International Law, Oxford 2005, 273. 
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ripheral differences and with the necessary cosmetic adaptations so to cover not 
only conduct by a State but also by non-State actors.32 On the other hand, the 
definition of indirect aggression contained in Article 1 (3) (h) of the Great Lakes 
Protocol is much broader than its 1974 version, as it includes not only the sending 
of armed groups or mercenaries,33 but also the provision of “any” support to them 
and to other organized transnational criminal groups “which might carry out hos-
tile acts against a member State”.34 Several observations can be made on this point. 
First, “transnational criminal groups”, as opposed to armed groups, bands, irregu-
lars or mercenaries, seems to refer to groups pursuing not political, but rather fi-
nancial or material benefits.35 Second, the groups do not need to carry out acts of 
armed force against another State (as in the General Assembly Definition), but 
more generic “hostile acts”. In fact, it is not even necessary that these groups actu-
ally commit hostile acts for their sending or support to amount to aggression, be-
ing sufficient that they “might” do so. Furthermore, the gravity of these (potential) 
acts has to be comparable, but does not necessarily have to amount (as required by 
the 1974 Definition and the AU Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact), to 
the previously listed acts of aggression. 
Finally, the last three cases of hostile acts amounting to acts of aggression listed 
in the Great Lakes Protocol do not appear in the 1974 Definition, although they 
are present in the AU Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact: “[a]cts of es-
pionage which could be used, contrary to Article 7 (4), for military aggression 
against a Member State”; “[t]echnological assistance of any kind, intelligence and 
training given to another State for use, contrary to Article 7 (4), with the aim of 
committing acts of aggression against another Member State”; and “[t]he encour-
                                                        
32
  The only acts of aggression that can be committed by a State only and not also by non-State ac-
tors are 1) the attack on the land, sea or air forces or marine and air fleets of a member State, and 2) the 
use of armed forces which are within the territory of another member State with the agreement of the 
latter in contravention of the conditions provided in the AU Non-aggression and Common Defence 
Pact (Art. 1 (3) (e) and (f)). It is to be noted that the latter situation refers to the AU Non-aggression 
and Common Defence Pact, and not to any agreement that member States might conclude for the sta-
tioning of their armed forces on each other’s territory. Art. 1 (3) (a) corresponds to the general, nar-
rower definition contained in Art. 1 of the 1974 General Assembly Definition, which therefore is just 
an example of the broader notion of aggression adopted in the Great Lakes Protocol. 
33
  During the negotiations that led to the General Assembly Definition, some States unsuccessfully 
supported the inclusion not only of “sending” but also of other forms of support (Stone, above note 
30, 238). 
34
  This provision is reinforced by Art. 8 of the Protocol, in particular by paras. (2) and (3), accord-
ing to which the States parties commit themselves to prohibit armed groups from using their territo-
ries as a base for committing, inter alia, acts of aggression against other member States and not to give 
any help “directly or indirectly, actively or passively” to armed groups operating against other mem-
ber States. 
35
  Art. 1 (x) of the AU Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact defines a “trans-national or-
ganized criminal group” as a “structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time 
and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes which are trans-national 
in scope, or offences established in accordance with international law, including the United Nations 
Convention Against Trans-national Organized Crime and its Protocols thereto, the purpose being 
which to obtain, directly or indirectly financial and other material benefits”. 
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agement, support, harboring or provision of any assistance for the commission of 
terrorist acts and other violent trans-national organized crimes against a Member 
State”.36 The decision to include these situations, which do not involve an attack, is 
questionable, as they technically amount to preparatory conduct or threats, and 
not to acts of aggression. 
It is to be pointed out that the States parties to the Great Lakes Protocol under-
take not only not to commit acts or threats of aggression, but also more broadly 
reaffirm their obligation “to renounce any resort to the threat or use of force as 
policies, or instrument of settling any differences, disputes, or the pursuit of na-
tional objectives” (Article 3 (1)) and not to intervene in the internal affairs of other 
States (Article 4 (2)).37 The prohibition of the use of force is repeated in Article 4 
(1), with a language closer to that of Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter.38 The only 
differences are that the inconsistency of the threat or use of force is referred not 
only to the Purposes of the United Nations but to the Charter as a whole39 and 
also to the “Constitutive Act of the African Union, the relevant resolutions of the 
Security Council of the United Nations and the African Union Peace and Security 
Council”. The renunciation of the threat and use of force is “without prejudice to 
the primary responsibility of Member States to preserve the integrity of their sov-
ereignty and to protect the lives and human rights of all persons and all peoples, 
including women and children, residing within their territories” (Article 3 (2)). 
This redundant clause could be interpreted as an emphatic reaffirmation of the 
right to self-defence, with a language updated in order to include the “responsibil-
ity to protect”.40 
Article 4 (5) includes, among the examples of violations of the principle of non-
intervention and of the prohibition of the use of force, the provision of “direct or 
indirect support whatsoever to armed groups engaged in armed conflict, violence, 
                                                        
36
  Art. 1 (3) (i), (j) and (k) of the Great Lakes Protocol. 
37
  Art. 7 (6) (e) of the Great Lakes Protocol also reaffirms the “duty to refrain, subject to the right 
of individual or collective self-defence, from the threat or use of force in violation of the existing inter-
national borders of another State to resolve any disputes, particularly territorial disputes and frontier 
incidents”. 
38
  It is interesting to note that the corresponding provision in the 1978 ECOWAS Protocol on 
Non-aggression is broader, as it prohibits not only threat and use of force and aggression, but also the 
employment of “any other means inconsistent with the Charters of the United Nations and the Or-
ganization of African Unity against the territorial integrity or political independence of other Member 
States” (Art. 1). 
39
  See, similarly, Art. 3 (a) of the AU Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact and Art. 1 of the 
ECOWAS Protocol on Non-aggression. On the contrary, Art. 3 (2) of the 2003 Southern African De-
velopment Community (SADC)’s Mutual Defence Pact refers the inconsistency of the use or threat of 
force to the Principles of the UN Charter only. The reference to the Charter as a whole would entail 
that a use of force, to be lawful, has to comply also with the Charter procedures (B. B. Ferencz, A 
Proposed Definition of Aggression: By Compromise and Consensus, 22 International and Compara-
tive Law Quarterly (1973), 416). 
40
  See below, Section 4. 
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and/or, the unconstitutional overthrow of a Government of another State”.41 The 
insistence of the Protocol on the prohibition of any assistance to armed groups is 
easily explained: many African armed rebellions would not have  occurred without 
external provision of arms and supplies, made possible by the permeability of un-
controlled borders.42 However, the Protocol is in sharp contrast with the conclu-
sions of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, where it held that not all forms of assistance 
given by a State to armed groups amount to a use of force, although they may con-
stitute an unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of another State.43 The Court 
also made clear that “the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces 
in another country, whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be re-
garded as unlawful intervention, or as in any way contrary to international law”:44 
from the perspective of the Great Lakes Protocol, though, even this form of assis-
tance would be prohibited. 
3. Self-Defence Issues 
The Great Lakes Protocol is not only a non-aggression pact, but also provides 
for mutual defence.45 Article 6 (1) reaffirms the inherent right of individual and col-
lective self-defence of the member States in the event of an armed attack “accord-
ing to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations”. An armed attack against 
one or more member States “shall be considered an attack against them all” and 
consequently each of them “will assist the State or States so attacked by taking 
forthwith, individually or in concert with the other Member States, such action as 
it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the 
peace, security, stability, and development of the Great Lakes Region” (Article 6 
(3)). By correctly limiting the right of self-defence to the occurrence of an “armed 
attack”, the Great Lakes Protocol differs from the AU Non-aggression and Com-
mon Defence Pact, that controversially links individual and collective self-defence 
“by all available means” to the broader notion of “aggression” (defined in Article 1 
                                                        
41
  Emphasis added. The Great Lakes States undertake not only not to support armed groups, but 
also to adopt the measures indicated in Art. 8. Failure to do so entails that a member State can be held 
responsible by other member States or called to account before the Summit of the Conference (Art. 8 
(11)). 
42
  Cilliers, above note 27, 24. It is therefore not surprising that Art. 7 of the Protocol, as well as one 
of the Sub-Programmes for Action, focus on security management of common borders. 
43
  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), Merits, Judg-
ment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports (1986), para. 228. 
44
  Nicaragua, above note 43, para. 242. 
45
  Several mutual defence pacts have been concluded at the African regional and sub-regional lev-
els, including the 2005 AU Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact, the 1989 Treaty creating the 
Union of the Arab Maghreb (Art. 14), the 2003 SADC Mutual Defence Pact, the 1981 ECOWAS Pro-
tocol Relating to Mutual Assistance in Defence, the 2000 ECCAS Pact of Mutual Assistance, the 2004 
CEMAC Pact of Non-aggression, Solidarity and Mutual Assistance. 
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(c) as expansively as in Article 1 of the Great Lakes Protocol)46 and even “threat of 
aggression” (Article 4 (b)): the consistency of the AU Pact with the UN Charter 
and with customary international law can thus be seriously doubted. 
The Great Lakes Protocol prescribes procedural obligations for the exercise of 
individual self-defence, i.e. the prior determination by the attacked State that its 
territory has been subject to an armed attack and the notification of the attack to 
the other member States, the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security 
Council (Article 6 (2)).47 Needless to say, non-compliance with these procedural 
obligations would not deprive the victim State of its right to individual self-
defence, which ultimately rests on the UN Charter and on customary international 
law. Nothing is said with regard to procedural obligations for the exercise of col-
lective self-defence.48 
According to the Great Lakes Protocol, an armed attack can be committed not 
only by a State, but by non-State actors as well: Article 5 (4) provides that “Mem-
ber States shall counter acts of aggression committed against anyone of them by 
armed groups, taking into account the provisions of Articles 6 [on self-defence] 
and 8”, while Article 8 (2) expressly refers to “armed groups [...] carrying out 
armed attacks”.49 Article 51 of the UN Charter is silent on this point, but, in its 
Advisory Opinion on the Legal consequences of the construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ interpreted it as referring only to “the case 
                                                        
46
  See above, Section 2. It is usually believed that “aggression” is broader than “armed attack”: see 
J. Combacau, The Exception of Self-Defence in the United Nations Practice, in: A. Cassese, The Cur-
rent Regulation of the Use of Force, Dordrecht-Boston-Lancaster 1986, 22; P. Lamberti Zanardi, Indi-
rect Military Aggression, ibid., 114; Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, Cambridge 2005, 
184; T.D. Gill, The Law of Armed Attack in the Context of the Nicaragua Case, 1 Hague Yearbook of 
International Law (1988), 36; A. Randelzhofer, Article 51, in: B. Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the 
United Nations: A Commentary, Oxford 2002, Vol. 2, 795; E. Sciso, L’aggressione indiretta nella de-
finizione dell’Assemblea generale delle Nazioni Unite, 66 Rivista di diritto internazionale (1983), 272-
275. Art. 6 of the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) expressly con-
templates a case of “aggression which is not an armed attack”, that gives rise only to the obligation to 
consult. Examples of acts of aggression not amounting to an armed attack are those listed in Art. 3 (c), 
(e), (f) of the General Assembly Definition of Aggression (Gill, above note 46, 32-33; Sciso, above note 
46, 275). Contra, see S.A. Alexandrov, Self-Defence Against the Use of Force in International Law, 
The Hague-London-Boston 1996, 114; B. Broms, The Definition of Aggression, 154 Recueil des cours 
de l’Académie de droit international de La Haye (1977-I), 370. 
47
  Article 51 only requires States to immediately report to the Security Council the measures taken 
in self-defence, not to notify the armed attack. Art. 6 (4) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact requires 
that the measures taken in response to an armed attack, along with the armed attack itself, “shall im-
mediately be reported to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Security Coun-
cil of the United Nations”. See also Art. 11 (4) (e) of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Se-
curity Co-operation. 
48
  In Nicaragua, the ICJ made clear that the exercise of the right of collective self-defence requires 
the declaration by the victim State that it has been the object of an armed attack and its request to a 
third State for intervention (above note 43, paras. 195, 199). See also Case concerning Oil Platforms 
(Iran v. United States), Merits, Judgment of 6 November 2003, para. 51. 
49
  The AU Non-aggression and Common Defence Pact also refers to aggression by non-State ac-
tors, triggering the right of individual and collective self-defence (Arts. 1 (c), 4 (b)). 
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of armed attack by one State against another State”.50 The majority opinion has 
however been criticized by the minority judges, including Judges Higgins, Kooij-
mans and Buergenthal.51 In DRC v. Uganda, the ICJ was more cautious and, al-
though it held that, as the attacks carried out by rebel groups against Uganda were 
non-attributable to the DRC, “the legal and factual circumstances for the exercise 
of a right of self-defence by Uganda against the DRC were not present”, it con-
cluded that “the Court has no need to respond to the contentions of the Parties as 
to whether and under what conditions contemporary international law provides 
for a right of self-defence against large-scale attacks by irregular forces”.52 Recent 
practice seems to show growing support for the right of self-defence against armed 
attacks by non-State actors.53 The Security Council reaffirmed the inherent right of 
individual and collective self-defence of the United States with regard to the 11 
September 2001 attacks by Al-Qaeda.54 The NATO and Rio Treaty machineries 
for collective self-defence were also activated in reaction to those attacks.55 In the 
2006 operations against Hezbollah militias based in southern Lebanon, most States 
recognized that Israel had the right of self-defence against their attacks, although 
some questioned the proportionality of the reaction. 56 Similarly, in February 2008 
the international community did not condemn Turkey’s military operation in 
northern Iraq in order to destroy the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) bases, even if 
the armed group’s actions were not supported by or imputable to Iraq.57 Hence, 
                                                        
50
  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advi-
sory Opinion of 9 July 2004, para. 139.  
51
  According to Judge Higgins, “nothing in the text of Article 51 [...] stipulates that self-defence is 
available only when an armed attack is made by a State” (Legality of the Wall, above note 50, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Higgins, para. 33). See also Judge Kooijmans’s Separate Opinion, para. 35 and Judge 
Buergenthal’s Declaration, para. 6 (ibid.). 
52
  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 
2005, para. 147. Judge Kooijmans and Judge Simma, however, argued that armed attacks carried out by 
non-State actors which are of sufficient scale and effect entitle to self-defence whether or not they can 
be attributed to the territorial State (Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, paras. 29-32; Separate 
Opinion of Judge Simma, para. 12). A commentator has maintained that the ICJ decisions in the Nica-
ragua and DRC v. Uganda cases “should not be understood as ruling out the legitimate use of defen-
sive force against non-State actors unless the armed attacks of such non-State actors are attributable to 
a State. Instead, the Court’s decisions should be understood as requiring that armed attacks be attrib-
utable to a State if the State itself is to be the subject of defensive uses of force” (K.N. Trapp, Back to 
Basics: Necessity, Proportionality, and the Right of Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors, 56 Inter-
national and Comparative Law Quarterly (2007), 145). 
53
  It could be noted than some less recent practice seems to support this view as well: after all, the 
Caroline incident (the locus classicus of the law of self-defence) involved a reaction against non-State 
actors (see the facts in R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AJIL (1938), 82-88, 92). 
54
  SC Resolutions 1368 (12 September 2001) and 1373 (28 September 2001). 
55
  N. Ronzitti, The Expanding Law of Self-Defence, 11 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 
(2006), 348. 
56
  Trapp, above note 52, 154-155. 
57
  R. van Steenberghe, Le Pacte de non-agression et de défense commune de l’Union Africaine: en-
tre unilatéralisme et responsabilité collective, 113 Revue générale de droit international public (2009), 
139. The Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan claimed that “[t]he cross-border operation is a result of 
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from this point of view, the Great Lakes Protocol’s version of the right of self-
defence is not contra, but rather præter legem: as Gill points out, “[i]t is not so 
much who is carrying out the use of force, but what the scale and effects of such an 
operation are – which is important in determining whether the operation consti-
tutes an ‘armed attack’”.58 In the context of the Great Lakes Protocol, the adoption 
of this interpretation can be explained in the light of the disfavor towards armed 
groups that permeates the entire Pact.59 
On the contrary, the specification in Article 6 (3) that the individual or collective 
defensive action must aim “to restore and maintain the peace, security, stability, 
and development of the Great Lakes Region” is highly problematic. This provision 
echoes the language of Article 1 (2) of the 2003 SADC Mutual Defence Pact, where 
it states that “collective self-defence” means “the measures undertaken collectively 
by the States Parties to ensure peace, stability and security in the Region”. Now, 
the purpose of self-defence is limited to avert an armed attack and does not extend 
to the maintenance of peace and security (which is the purpose of collective secu-
rity) or even stability and development. As the ICJ held in Nicaragua, under cus-
tomary international law self-defence only warrants “measures which are propor-
tional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it”.60 A broader freedom of 
action might easily be used to justify illegal interventions and regime change as the 
result of an initially defensive action, something that existing law clearly does not 
allow.61 To the extent that Article 6 (3) purports to allow armed actions to restore 
peace, security, stability and development without Security Council authorization, 
it is incompatible with Articles 2 (4) and 53 of the UN Charter, which would pre-
vail ex-Article 10 (3) of the Protocol.62 
There is also another problem. Under Article 8 of the Great Lakes Protocol, 
States parties commit themselves to apprehend, intercept and disarm members of 
armed groups that are using or attempting to use their territory, far from the bor-
der, to prepare or conduct armed attacks or subversive activities against other 
States (Article 8 (4)) or that are fleeing across their common borders (Article 8 (5)). 
                                                                                                                                              
Turkey’s right to self-defence” (Iraq Demands that Turkey Withdraw its Troops, Times On Line, 26 
February 2008, <www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article3439329.ece>). 
58
  Gill, above note 46, 50. 
59
  The provisions on collective self-defence against attacks by non-State actors appear to have been 
put into practice in December 2008, when Sudan, Uganda and the DRC launched a joint operation 
against the Lord’s Resistance Army in the northeastern DRC, and in January-February 2009, when 
the DRC and Rwanda conducted joint military operations against the FDLR and the ex-
Far/Interahamwe in the eastern DRC. 
60
  Nicaragua, above note 43, para. 176. See also Oil Platforms, above note 48, paras. 51, 76. 
61
  See Ronzitti, above note 55, 352-353, who however concedes that “actions in self-defence and 
actions aimed at restoring peace and security are becoming ever more blurred”. 
62
  Art. 10 (3) provides that “[n]othing contained in this Protocol shall be construed to be contrary 
to the provisions of the Pact, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, and the Charter of the United 
Nations”. Art. 30 (2) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties makes clear that “[w]hen 
a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier 
or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail”. 
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Accordingly, a member State engaged in the “hot pursuit” of members of an armed 
group has first to inform and notify the member State towards which the armed 
groups are fleeing and request it to intercept, apprehend and disarm them (Article 
8 (6)). If the member State is “unwilling or unable to intercept armed groups in 
flight or operating on its territory”, it will be “encouraged” to enter into bilateral 
agreements specifying “the conditions under which the armed forces of another 
Member State may undertake the hot pursuit of the said armed groups” (Article 8 
(7)). So far so good. Nevertheless, Article 8 (10) specifies that none of the above 
provisions “shall affect the right of individual or collective self-defence in the event 
of an armed attack, or the failure, after notification or request, to intercept and dis-
arm members of an armed group pursued by the defence and security forces of a 
Member State”.63 Therefore, the Protocol introduces a second situation that trig-
gers the right of self-defence in addition to the occurrence of an armed attack, i.e. 
“failure, after notification or request, to intercept and disarm members of an armed 
group pursued by the defence and security forces of a Member State”.64 This situa-
tion seems to refer only to the case of “hot pursuit” on land, i.e. “the uninterrupted 
continuation into a no man’s land or into the territory of another State [...] of the 
pursuit of an offender or a group of offenders started by the authorities immedi-
ately after the commission of an offence”,65 and not to the different Lebanon-like 
scenario where the armed group permanently operates against a State from the ter-
ritory of another country and there is no “following the tail”66 of fugitives but 
rather a reaction to attacks originating from across the border.67 The doctrine of 
hot pursuit on land was most famously invoked by the racist regimes of South Af-
rica and Rhodesia to justify their incursions in neighbouring countries.68 However, 
                                                        
63
  Emphasis added. 
64
  The situation would of course be different if the armed group had been “sent” by the State 
where they seek refuge, as this amounts to an armed attack by that State, at least when the armed 
group’s operation “because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather 
than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces” (Nicaragua, above 
note 43, para. 195; see also DRC v. Uganda, above note 52, para. 146). In fact, in this case the members 
of the armed group are de facto agents of the sending State (Lamberti Zanardi, above note 46, 112; 
Randelzhofer, above note 46, 800-801; Sciso, above note 46, 259). 
65
  N.M. Poulantzas, The Right of Hot Pursuit in International Law, The Hague-London-New 
York 2002, 11. 
66
  L. Beehner, Can States Invoke “Hot Pursuit” to Hunt Rebels?, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 
June 2007, <www.cfr.org/publication/13440> (quoting Michael P. Scharf). 
67
  This is supported by a literal interpretation of Art. 8 (10), that refers to “pursued” members of 
an armed group. Furthermore, like Art. 8 (5), Art. 8 (10) mentions “to intercept and disarm” the mem-
bers of the armed group, while Art. 8 (4) refers to “apprehend and disarm, far from their common 
borders”. 
68
  C. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, Oxford 2008, 137-138. South Africa eventu-
ally abandoned this justification. More recently in Africa, Chad has repeatedly claimed its right to pur-
sue rebels into Sudan (“Chadian Army Chases Rebels in Sudan, Aid Groups Prepare to Pull Some 
Staff from Border Town”, USA Today, 15 December 2006, (<www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-
12-15-chad-sudan_x.htm>), “Cross-Border Clashes Between Chad and the Sudan”, Press release, 10 
April 2007, <www.usau.usmission.gov/chad-sudan-clash.html>; “Chad tells UN will carry out hot 
pursuit of rebels”, Reuters, 1 February 2008, available at <www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/ 
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the UN Charter does not provide for this exception to the prohibition of the use 
of force and the existence of such a right under customary international law has 
always been questioned: Brownlie for instance recalls that “[i]t is doubtful if any 
right of hot pursuit can be justified by reference to The Caroline doctrine, and the 
State practice hardly supports it as a customary right. Claims to the right are ex-
ceptional; numerous treaty provisions assume that no such right exists; and in sev-
eral disputes where it would have been open to one of the parties to allege such a 
right, no claim was made. Works of authority make no reference to it, with the ex-
ception of works devoted to United States practice”.69 It is true that some (but not 
many) precedents where States invoked the doctrine of hot pursuit on land do ex-
ist, but they do not seem to be supported by the necessary opinio juris.70 Indeed, 
practice in relation to the US incursions into Mexico in pursuit of Francisco Villa’s 
bands, France’s pursuit of members of Algeria’s Front de Libération Nationale into 
Morocco and Tunisia, and South Vietnam and United States’ trespassing into 
Cambodia to pursue the Vietcong shows that the pursuing States expressly or im-
plicitly recognized that hot pursuit on land is a violation of the sovereignty of the 
State whose border is trespassed unless this has authorized the incursion or an 
agreement allowing it has been concluded.71 In particular, it is significant that, after 
initially invoking it, France subsequently rejected the doctrine of hot pursuit as a 
possible legal justification for its incursions into Morocco and Tunisia.72 Also, in 
Resolution 568 of 21 June 1985, the Security Council clearly denounced and re-
jected the above mentioned “racist South Africa’s practice of ‘hot pursuit’ to ter-
rorize and destabilize Botswana and other countries in southern Africa”. More re-
cently, Iraq rejected Turkey’s request to be allowed to cross the border in pursuit 
of the PKK (September 2007): the Turkish request and the Iraqi rejection clearly 
show that neither country believed that a customary right of hot pursuit exists.73 
                                                                                                                                              
idUSN01424661>; “Chad carried out new air raid in Darfur – Sudan”, Sudan Tribune, 16 July 2009, 
<www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article31836>). “Hot pursuit” operations have also been carried 
out by Ethiopia into Somalia (“Ethiopia troops ‘back in Somalia’”, BBC, 19 May 2009, available at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8057115.stm>) and Kenya (C. Mwaûra, G. Baechler, B. 
Kiplagat, Background to Conflicts in the IGAD Region, in: C. Mwaûra and S. Schmeidl (eds.), Early 
Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa, Lawrenceville, NJ 2002, 40). 
69
  I. Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 International and Com-
parative Law Quarterly (1958), 734. Wooldridge also denies the existence of a right of hot pursuit on 
land under customary international law (F. Wooldridge, Hot Pursuit, Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, Vol. 2 (1999), 882). See similarly J. Charpentier, Existe-t-il un droit de 
suite?, 65 Revue générale de droit international public (1961), 307-309; M. Giuliano, T. Scovazzi, T. 
Treves, Diritto internazionale, Milano 1983, Vol. 2, 535-536; Poulantzas, above note 65, 11-12. 
70
  See the detailed examination of State practice undertaken by Poulantzas, above note 65, 13-35. 
71
  F. Pocar, L’esercizio non autorizzato del potere statale in territorio straniero, Padova 1974, 30-
37. 
72
  Charpentier, above note 69, 302-305. According to the French Prime Minister Debré, “[l]e droit 
de suite, ou de poursuite, n’est défini par le droit international que dans le cadre d’accords conclus en-
tre les Etats limitrophes intéressés” (quoted ibid., 304). 
73
  Keesing’s Record of World Events (2007), 48151. The 1984 Security Protocol concluded by Tur-
key and Iraq allowed the parties to enter each other’s territory to a maximum depth of five kilometres 
  Neighbourhood Watch? The African Great Lakes Pact and ius ad bellum 947 
ZaöRV 69 (2009) 
Many States condemned the March 2008 Colombian cross-border raid into Ecua-
dor in what was (incorrectly) labeled by Colombian President Uribe a “hot pur-
suit” mission against Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) re-
bels,74 and the Organization of American States (OAS)’s Permanent Council quali-
fied it as a “violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ecuador and of 
principles of international law”.75 In June 2008, Pakistan also strongly protested 
against the US hot pursuit air attacks against militants who had fled into Pakistan 
after an ambush on the Afghan side of the border.76 As to the possible justification 
of “hot pursuit” as a self-defence action, apart from the ontological differences be-
tween the two notions,77 in DRC v. Uganda the ICJ made clear that “Article 51 of 
the Charter may justify a use of force in self-defence only within the strict confines 
there laid down [i.e., in the case of the occurrence of an armed attack]. It does not 
allow the use of force by a State to protect perceived security interests beyond 
these parameters. Other means are available to a concerned State, including, in par-
                                                                                                                                              
without the need for ad hoc consent to the incursion (F. Keskin, Turkey’s Trans-Border Operations in 
Northern Iraq: Before and After the Invasion of Iraq, 8 Research Journal of International Studies 
(November 2008), 63). The Protocol was however not renewed in 1989. Although its legal justifica-
tions for the incursions have often been vague, it appears that, until 1991, Turkey relied on the hot 
pursuit doctrine (ibid., 62, 64). On the other hand, Iran, which also carried out cross-border opera-
tions into Iraq against Kurdish terrorist groups, consistently relied on self-defence (C. Gray and S. 
Olleson, The Limits of the Law on the Use of Force: Turkey, Iraq and the Kurds, 12 Finnish Year-
book of International Law (2001), 407). For Turkey’s post-2003 incursions into Iraq, see Gray, above 
note 68, 142-143. 
74
  L.E. Nagle, Colombia’s Incursion into Ecuadorian Territory: Justified Hot Pursuit or Pugna-
cious Error?, 17 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy (2007-2008), 360. In reality, the operation 
was not a case of hot pursuit, but rather a case of an armed group based in the territory of a 
neighbouring country and permanently operating from there: indeed, no pursuit of FARC rebels had 
started in Colombian territory before penetrating into Ecuador (see the chronology of the events in 
F.M. Walsh, Rethinking the Legality of Colombia’s Attacks on the FARC in Ecuador: A New Para-
digm for Balancing Territorial Integrity, Self-Defense and the Duties of Sovereignty, 21 Pace Interna-
tional Law Review (2009), 137-138). For the reactions to the operation, see Th. Christakis, The Legal-
ity of Cross-Border Military Operations to Hunt Down Rebels, Interest Group on Peace and Secu-
rity, <http://igps.wordpress.com/discussions/the-legality-of-cross-border-military-operations-to-
hunt-down-rebels>. 
75
  CP/RES. 930 (1632/08), 5 March 2008. See also the Resolution of the 25th Meeting of Consulta-
tion of the OAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopted on 17 March 2008 (RC.25/RES.1/08). 
76
  “Pakistan Fury over US ‘Hot Pursuit’ Attacks”, CNN, 11 June 2008, <www.cnn.com/2008/ 
WORLD/asiapcf/06/11/pakistan.troops.killed/index.html>. From a classified 2005 document, it ap-
pears that the US forces in Iraq were also authorized to pursue former members of the Saddam Hus-
sein’s government and suspected terrorists across the border into Iran and Syria (E. Schmitt and M.R. 
Gordon, Leak on Cross-Border Chases from Iraq, The New York Times, 4 February 2008, <www. 
nytimes.com/2008/02/04/washington/04rules.html>). 
77
  A commentator has noted that “the objective of the right of self-defence is the repulse of aggres-
sion or simply of an armed attack and the protection of the territorial integrity or political independ-
ence of a State. On the other hand, the main objective of the right of hot pursuit is the effective ad-
ministration of justice of an injured State and the bringing before its courts and punishment of wrong-
doers” (Poulantzas, above note 65, 16). 
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ticular, recourse to the Security Council”.78 It is therefore doubtful that Article 8 
(10) of the Great Lakes Protocol is compatible with the UN Charter and custom-
ary international law where it allows armed incursions in hot pursuit into the terri-
tory of another State even if the bilateral agreements mentioned in Article 8 (7) 
have not been concluded between the concerned States. The primacy of the Char-
ter is guaranteed by Article 10 (3) of the Great Lakes Protocol and by Article 103 
of the Charter itself, and thus “no right or claim incompatible with Charter obliga-
tions may be invoked by the parties”.79 
4. The “Responsibility to Protect” 
Even though it has been claimed that it is not a real innovation but simply a re-
statement, with new terminology, of well-known concepts,80 it is usually believed 
that the notion of “responsibility to protect” was conceived by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 as a human se-
curity initiative81 and was later endorsed in other documents, such as the UN 
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’s Report “A More Secure 
World”,82 the UN Secretary-General’s Report “In Larger Freedom”,83 and the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document.84 All the above mentioned texts rest on 
the idea that State sovereignty implies responsibility. In particular, States have the 
                                                        
78
  DRC v. Uganda, above note 52, para. 148. It has however been noted that “[i]t seems unrealistic 
that a State facing attacks from insurgents operating out of the territory of a dysfunctional State has no 
remedies in the international system” (P.N. Okowa, Congo’s War: The Legal Dimension of a Pro-
tracted Conflict, 77 British Year Book of International Law (2006), 249). 
79
  R. Bernhardt, Article 103, in Simma et al., above note 46, 1297. 
80
  L. Boisson de Chazournes and L. Condorelli, De la “responsabilité de protéger”, ou d’une nou-
velle parure pour une notion déjà bien établie, 110 Revue générale de droit international public (2006), 
11-18. See for instance Art. 1 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the protection of the vic-
tims of war. See also the considerations of the ICJ in the Palestine Wall Advisory Opinion, above note 
50, paras. 154-160. 
81
  International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “The Responsibility to Pro-
tect” (2001), available at <www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp>. 
82
  Above note 23. 
83
  Above note 23. 
84
  Above note 23. The Security Council also referred to the responsibility to protect in Res. 1674 
(28 April 2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict and in Res. 1706 (31 August 2006) on 
Darfur. On 21 February 2008, the UN Secretary-General appointed Edward C. Luck as Special Ad-
viser on the Responsibility to Protect and on 12 January 2009 presented a Report on “Implementing 
the Responsibility to Protect” (A/63/677). The UN General Assembly has “taken note” of the Secre-
tary-General’s Report in Resolution 63/308 (14 September 2009), adopted without vote. The EU Re-
port on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy “Providing Security in a Changing 
World”, approved by the EU Council on 11 December 2008, also contains direct references to the re-
sponsibility to protect with regard to genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war 
crimes (at 2, 12; available at <www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/ 
reports/104630.pdf>). 
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primary responsibility to protect their own citizens,85 but if they are unable or un-
willing to do so, then the international community has the complementary respon-
sibility to step in and take action with or without the consent of the territorial 
State.86 The responsibility to protect, which is a broader concept than “humanitar-
ian intervention”,87 comprises a “continuum of obligations” including the respon-
sibility to prevent, to react and to rebuild: the responsibility to prevent addresses 
“both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made 
crises putting populations at risk”, the responsibility to react involves responding 
“to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may 
include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in ex-
treme cases military intervention”, and the responsibility to rebuild means “to 
provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, re-
construction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention 
was designed to halt or avert”.88 
The on-going humanitarian crisis in Darfur and the Rwanda and DRC syn-
dromes have determined a growing support for the responsibility to protect doc-
trine in Africa. For instance, the recent 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention 
Framework affirms that ECOWAS can intervene (militarily if necessary) to pro-
tect human security and to exercise the responsibility to prevent, react “in response 
to grave and compelling humanitarian disasters” and rebuild.89 At least five of the 
ten Protocols that form an integral part of the Great Lakes Pact aim to implement 
aspects of the responsibility to protect. The Non-aggression and Mutual Defence 
Protocol, however, refers to it expressly.90 Article 3 (2) affirms the “primary re-
sponsibility of Member States to preserve the integrity of their sovereignty and to 
protect the lives and human rights of all persons and all peoples, including women 
and children, residing within their territories”. The complementary responsibility 
of other States is recognized in Article 4 (8), according to which “Member States 
agree that the provisions of this Article [on the prohibition of the threat and use of 
force] and Article 5 [on non-aggression] of this Protocol shall not impair the exer-
cise of their responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, eth-
                                                        
85
  According to the ICISS Report, “sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally – to re-
spect sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people 
within the State” (The Responsibility to Protect, above note 81, para. 1.35). 
86
  “The Responsibility to Protect”, above note 81, para. 2.29; “A More Secure World”, above note 
23, para. 201; “In Larger Freedom”, above note 23, para. 135; 2005 World Summit Outcome Docu-
ment, above note 23, paras. 138-139. 
87
  “The Responsibility to Protect”, above note 81, para. 2.29. In his recent Report, the UN Secre-
tary-General recalled that “the responsibility to protect is an ally of sovereignty, not an adversary. It 
grows from the positive and affirmative notion of sovereignty as responsibility, rather than from the 
narrower idea of humanitarian intervention” (“Implementing the Responsibility to Protect”, above 
note 84, para. 10 (a)). 
88
  “The Responsibility to Protect”, above note 81, at xi. 
89
  The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, above note 28, paras. 26, 41. 
90
  The drafters of the Protocol were influenced by the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, 
that had just been adopted. 
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nic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and gross violations of human rights com-
mitted by, or within, a State”.91 As this provision is drafted as an exception to the 
renunciation of the threat and use of force and to the prohibition of aggression, it 
implies that the responsibility to protect (and, in particular, to react) can also be 
exercised through the unilateral use of military force, an option that the ICISS ex-
pressly admits if only in extreme cases and as a last resort.92 This seems confirmed 
by the Joint Statement of the Heads of State of the Great Lakes Region of 7 No-
vember 2008, according to which “[t]he Great Lakes region would not stand by to 
witness incessant and destructive acts of violence by any armed groups against in-
nocent people of DRC; if and when necessary the Great Lakes Region will send 
peacemaking forces into the Kivu Province of the DRC”.93 However, it is well-
known that the UN Charter only provides for two exceptions to the prohibition 
of the use of armed force (i.e. self-defence and collective security under Chapter 
VII) and, as recognized by the ICISS itself,94 it is doubtful that customary interna-
tional law allows armed interventions on grounds of humanity.95 
This claim to use force in order to protect populations is also contained in other 
African sub-regional treaties, which however employ the more traditional expres-
sion “humanitarian intervention”.96 At the regional level, Article 4 (h) of the AU 
Constitutive Act provides that one of the basic principles on which the African 
Union is founded is “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursu-
                                                        
91
  An identical reference to the responsibility to protect also appears in the preamble. 
92
  “The Responsibility to Protect”, above note 81, paras. 4.1, 4.10 ff. According to the ICISS, the 
military action must meet six criteria: right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, propor-
tional means and reasonable prospects (ibid., para. 4.16). The Report, however, does not explain the 
grounds on which the legality would be founded (J.I. Levitt, The Responsibility to Protect: A Beaver 
Without a Dam?, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law (2003-2004), 161). On the contrary, the 
recent UN Secretary-General Report “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect” clearly affirms 
that “the responsibility to protect does not alter, indeed it reinforces, the legal obligations of Member 
States to refrain from the use of force except in conformity with the Charter” (above note 84, para. 3). 
93
  The Joint Statement can be read at <www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/projects/greatlakes/ihl-
greatlakes-summary-new-latest.htm>. 
94
  According to the Commission, “there is not yet a sufficiently strong basis to claim the emer-
gence of a new principle of customary international law” allowing intervention for human protection 
purposes (“The Responsibility to Protect”, above note 81, paras. 2.24 and 6.17). The responsibility to 
protect, thus, is not a legal principle but rather a policy option (E. McClean, The Responsibility to 
Protect: The Role of International Human Rights Law, 13 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 
(2008), 135). 
95
  Gray, above note 68, 51. 
96
  This terminology is criticized by the ICISS as it might cast an aggressive light on the intervening 
States (“The Responsibility to Protect”, above note 81, paras. 1.39-1.41). See, e.g., the Protocol Relat-
ing to the Peace and Security Council of Central Africa (COPAX), whose Art. 24 provides that the 
Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC) will be entrusted, inter alia, with “humanitarian in-
tervention following a humanitarian disaster”. The same task is given to ECOMOG by Art. 22 of the 
Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping 
and Security. Art. 40 further specifies that “ECOWAS shall intervene to alleviate the suffering of the 
populations and restore life to normalcy in the event of crises, conflict and disaster”. However, the 
subsequent ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, adopted in 2008, refers to the “responsibility 
to react”, above note 28, see para. 41. 
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ant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”.97 There are several important dif-
ferences between the AU Constitutive Act and the Great Lakes Protocol. First of 
all, while the AU Constitutive Act refers to a right of intervention,98 the Protocol 
employs the ambiguous notion of “responsibility”, which seems to imply that tak-
ing action is not only a right of the States parties but also an obligation that has to 
be performed after a collective decision and with due notice to the AU Peace and 
Security Council and the UN Security Council. It is however difficult to see how 
the responsibility to protect could amount to a positive obligation: the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document is cautious on this point99 and several States, includ-
ing the United Kingdom and the United States, have clearly indicated that they re-
gard the “responsibility to protect” as a political, not legal, commitment.100 Even 
assuming that it is indeed an obligation, then the problem arises of what are the le-
gal consequences of its violation.101 
Second, the Great Lakes Protocol extends the circumstances that trigger the pos-
sible armed reaction to cover not only genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, but also ethnic cleansing and gross violations of human rights.102 The lan-
                                                        
97
  This right is reiterated in Art. 4 (j) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the AU 
Peace and Security Council. The right of intervention pertains to the Union, and not to individual 
member States, which are under an obligation not to interfere in the internal affairs of another State 
(Art. 4 (g) of the AU Constitutive Act). The Assembly is the organ that decides on intervention with 
respect to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. 
98
  On the contrary, Art. 3 (d) of the AU Non-aggression Pact seems to refer more to an obligation 
than to a right of intervention, where it provides that “States Parties undertake to prohibit and prevent 
genocide, other forms of mass murder as well as crimes against humanity” (emphasis added). 
99
  2005 World Summit Outcome Document, above note 23, para. 139 (“[W]e are prepared to take 
collective action [...] on a case-by-case basis”). 
100
  Reinventing Humanitarian Intervention: Two Cheers for the Responsibility to Protect?, House 
of Commons Library Research Paper 08/55 (17 June 2008), 26-27. 
101
  C. Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 AJIL 
(2007), 117-118. On the justiciability of the obligation to intervene, at least to prevent genocide, see 
G.A. Critchlow, Stopping Genocide Through International Agreement when the Security Council 
Fails to Act, 40 Georgetown Journal of International Law (2009), 330-332. 
102
  It appears that “[t]he limitation of the grounds for intervention to war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity [in the AU Constitutive Act] was predicated on the understanding that these 
acts are now generally recognized as violations of international law, as evidenced in the statutes of the 
international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia, and more recently the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. As it presently stands, therefore, Article 4 (h) is in line 
with current international law” (T. Maluwa, The OAU/African Union and International Law: Map-
ping New Boundaries or Revising Old Terrain?, 98 ASIL Proceedings (2004), 236). The ICISS refers 
the responsibility to protect to “extreme cases” where “serious and irreparable harm [is] occurring to 
human beings, or imminently likely to occur”, in particular “large scale loss of life, actual or appre-
hended, with genocidal intent or not” and “large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, 
whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape” (“The Responsibility to Pro-
tect”, above note 81, paras. 4.18-4.19). The High-Level Panel’s Report refers to “genocide and other 
large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law” and to 
“mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and 
exposure to disease” (above note 82, paras. 201, 207). The “In Larger Freedom” Report more vaguely 
refers to “human rights and well-being of civilian populations” (above note 23, para. 135). The 2005 
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guage on this point differs from treaty to treaty. For instance, unlike the AU Con-
stitutive Act, Article 3 (d) of the AU Non-aggression Pact refers to “genocide, 
other forms of mass murder as well as crimes against humanity”. The 2001 SADC 
Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, as to it, includes geno-
cide, ethnic cleansing and gross violations of human rights among the matters that 
might give rise to the Organ’s action, but not war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity (Article 11 (2) (b) (i)). The 1999 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and 
Security adopts a more general and vague language and refers to an internal conflict 
that threatens to cause a “humanitarian disaster” and to “serious and massive viola-
tion of human rights and the rule of law” (Article 25), while the almost identical 
Article 25 of the COPAX Protocol omits the reference to the massive violations of 
human rights. Finally, according to the ECCAS Pact of Mutual Assistance, 
FOMAC’s intervention can take place when necessary to put an end to the com-
mission of international crimes (Article 7 (1)). War crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity are not defined in the Great Lakes Non-aggression Protocol, but 
Article 1 of the Protocol for the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity and all forms of Discrimi-
nation (also part of the Great Lakes Pact) refers to the definitions contained in Ar-
ticles 6, 7 and 8 of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).103 This is not entirely satisfactory, as not all war crimes under customary in-
ternational law have been incorporated in the Rome Statute and some of them have 
been defined more narrowly.104 Furthermore, the ICC definition of crimes against 
humanity, that limits them to attacks directed against civilian populations only, 
probably does not reflect customary international law.105 Unsatisfactorily as it 
might be, at least war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide have been de-
fined, although indirectly, in the Great Lakes Pact. On the other hand, the inclu-
sion of ethnic cleansing is problematic, as the exact legal meaning of this expression 
is not uncontroversial.106 Furthermore, massive violations of human rights may jus-
                                                                                                                                              
World Summit Outcome Document mentions genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity (above note 23, paras. 138-139). In his 2009 Report, the UN Secretary-General ar-
gues that “[t]he responsibility to protect applies, until Member States decide otherwise, only to the 
four specified crimes and violations: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against human-
ity. To try to extend it to cover other calamities [...] would undermine the 2005 consensus and stretch 
the concept beyond recognition or operational utility” (“Implementing the Responsibility to Protect”, 
above note 84, para. 10 (b)). 
103
  It is worth recalling that all the four situations currently being investigated by the ICC refer to 
States parties to the Great Lakes Pact (DRC, Uganda, CAR and Sudan). 
104
  A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, Oxford 2008, 94-97. 
105
  Cassese, above note 104, 122-123. 
106
  N. Lerner, Ethnic Cleansing, 24 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1994), 105-109, 116; D. 
Petrovic, Ethnic Cleansing – An Attempt at Methodology, 5 European Journal of International Law 
(1994), 344, 351, who defines “ethnic cleansing” as “a well-defined policy of a particular group of per-
sons to systematically eliminate another group from a given territory on the basis of religious, ethnic 
or national origin [which] involves violence and is very often connected with military operations” 
(ibid., 351). The ICJ referred to “ethnic cleansing” in the Genocide case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
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tify condemnation or sanctions, but not coercive measures: their inclusion in Arti-
cle 4 (8) of the Great Lakes Non-aggression Protocol is dangerous, as it might be 
used as a pretext for abusive interventions, especially considering the human rights 
record of many African countries. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that no-
where does the Protocol specify who should ascertain when the relevant situations 
(i.e., genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and gross vio-
lations of human rights) have arisen, even though this is of extreme importance, 
since it is their occurrence that justifies the intervention. Article 4 (8) of the Great 
Lakes Protocol limits itself to say that the decision to exercise the responsibility to 
protect, which logically involves the previous establishment that the pertinent 
situations have occurred, has to be taken “collectively”. However, much room is 
left to political appreciation.107 
Finally, and most importantly, Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act pro-
vides for a right of intervention in a member State.108 This allows to construe the 
provision consistently with the UN Charter and customary international law. In-
deed, it can be argued that the AU Constitutive Act does not introduce a further 
exception to the prohibition of the use of force, as it limits itself to provide for a 
case of intervention by invitation, where the invitation is given by a State not on a 
case-by-case basis with regard to a specific existing event, but “pre-emptively” by 
ratifying the Act or the Protocol and therefore by consenting in advance to the 
right of the Union to intervene on the member State’s territory if any of the listed 
grave circumstances occurs.109 The language of the Great Lakes Protocol is differ-
ent, as the responsibility to protect is invoked with regard to violations committed 
                                                                                                                                              
Serbia and Montenegro), Merits, Judgment of 26 February 2007, para. 190, where, by referring to the 
Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
780 (1992), it defined it as “rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation 
to remove persons of given groups from the area”. On the definition of “ethnic cleansing” and on 
whether it amounts to genocide, see W.A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, Cambridge 2009, 
221-234. It should be noted that ethnic cleansing is included among the grounds for the exercise of the 
responsibility to protect in the ICISS Report (above note 81, para. 4.19), the High-Level Panel Report 
“A More Secure World” (above note 23, para. 203) and the 2005 Outcome Document (above note 23, 
para. 138). In his recent Report on the implementation of the responsibility to protect, though, the 
UN Secretary-General noted that “[e]thnic cleansing is not a crime in its own right under international 
law, but acts of ethnic cleansing may constitute one of the three crimes [genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity]” (“Implementing the Responsibility to Protect”, above note 84, para. 3). 
107
  This point is highlighted by Abass with regard to Art. 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act (A. Ab-
ass, The United Nations, the African Union and the Darfur Crisis: Of Apology and Utopia, 54 Neth-
erlands International Law Review (2007), 426). 
108
  More problematic is Art. 3 (d) of the AU Pact on Non-aggression, as it does not limit the com-
mitment to prohibit and prevent genocide, crimes against humanity and “other forms of mass murder” 
to the territory of member States. However, as Art. 17 provides that the Pact cannot be interpreted as 
derogating from the provisions of the UN Charter and the AU Constitutive Act, the same considera-
tions made with regard to the Great Lakes Protocol would apply (see below, note 114 et seq. and ac-
companying text). 
109
  This is also the opinion of A. Abass and M.A. Baderin, Towards Effective Collective Security 
and Human Rights Protection in Africa: An Assessment of the Constitutive Act of the New African 
Union, 49 Netherlands International Law Review (2002), 18-19. 
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by, or within, “a State”, not necessarily a State party. By doing so, the Great Lakes 
States claim a responsibility to intervene on the territory of any State even without 
its consent. It is also worth noting that the intervention is not subordinated to the 
previous authorization of the UN Security Council: Article 4 (8) refers only to a 
“procedural notice” to the AU Peace and Security Council and to the UN Security 
Council.110 This echoes Article 52 of the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and 
Security, which provides for a mere duty to inform the United Nations, “[i]n ac-
cordance with Chapters VII and VIII” of the Charter, of any military intervention 
undertaken by the Organization, but differs from the SADC Protocol on Politics, 
Defence and Security Co-operation, whose Article 11 (3) (d) subordinates en-
forcement action, including in the case of genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross vio-
lations of human rights, to the authorization of the UN Security Council, in ac-
cordance with Article 53 of the Charter. Not even an ex post facto authorization is 
required by the Great Lakes Protocol, as recommended by the ICISS Report,111 the 
High-Level Panel’s “A More Secure World”112 and the AU Common Position 
known as the “Ezulwini Consensus”.113 The only limit is that the decision be taken 
“collectively”, which seems to prohibit interventions at the initiative of individual 
States. 
The provision under examination raises serious problems. It is clearly inconsis-
tent with both the UN Charter and the AU Constitutive Act, as “military inter-
vention for human protection purposes without the authorization of the Security 
Council is still illegal”.114 However, Article 10 (3) of the Great Lakes Protocol sta-
tes that “[n]othing contained in this Protocol shall be construed to be contrary to 
the provisions of the Pact, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, and the 
Charter of the United Nations”. The only way to construe the Protocol consis-
tently with the UN Charter and with the AU Constitutive Act would be to inter-
pret the reference to “a State” as to “a member State”, therefore providing for a 
case of intervention by invitation as in the AU Constitutive Act. Indeed, in his Re-
                                                        
110
  The ICISS does not rule out the use of force not authorized by the Security Council if a “con-
science-shocking situation crying out for action” occurs and the Security Council is inactive, although 
it does not take position on its legality (“The Responsibility to Protect”, above note 81, paras. 6.37-
6.40). On the contrary, the UN documents all require Security Council authorization for the use of 
military force (“A More Secure World”, above note 23, para. 203; “In Larger Freedom”, above note 
23, para. 126; World Summit Outcome Document, above note 23, para. 139; “Implementing the Re-
sponsibility to Protect”, above note 84, para. 11 (c)). 
111
  “The Responsibility to Protect”, above note 81, at xiii. 
112
  “A More Secure World”, above note 23, para. 272. 
113
  AU Common Position on the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change (Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII) (7-8 March 2005), <www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/AU_ 
Ezulwini%20Consensus.pdf>, at 6 (“Intervention of Regional Organizations should be with the ap-
proval of the Security Council; although in certain situations, such approval could be granted ‘after the 
fact’ in circumstances requiring urgent action”). 
114
  G. Molier, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect After 9/11, 53 Nether-
lands International Law Review (2006), 52. 
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port on the Fragmentation of International Law, Koskenniemi suggests that clauses 
like Article 10 (3) provide for a “rebuttable presumption of harmony between the 
earlier and the subsequent treaty”.115 Similarly, Jennings and Watts claim the exis-
tence of a “presumption that the parties intend something not inconsistent with 
generally recognized principles of international law, or with previous treaty obli-
gations towards third states”.116 Furthermore, although not referring to a treaty but 
to the declaration by which Portugal had accepted the ICJ jurisdiction, in the 
Right of Passage (Preliminary Objections) case the Court held that “[i]t is a rule of 
interpretation that a text emanating from a Government must, in principle, be in-
terpreted as producing and as intended to produce effects in accordance with exist-
ing law and not in violation of it”.117 The above suggested interpretation of Article 
4 (8) would also be consistent with Article 2 of the Great Lakes Protocol, which 
reaffirms the respect for the sovereignty, inviolability of borders and territorial in-
tegrity of (all) States. 
5. Intervention to Restore Democracy 
Democracy, development and security are strongly linked in Africa, where the 
enhancement of democratic institutions is seen as essential for improved economic 
performance.118 The adoption, in 2003, of a Protocol amending the AU Constitu-
tive Act has to be read in this light. When the Protocol enters into force, Article 4 
(h) of the AU Constitutive Act will incorporate “serious threats to legitimate or-
der” as a further ground for intervention by the Union.119 The Protocol does not 
explain what the “legitimate order” is: however, Article 24 of the 2007 African 
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance may provide some guidance to 
the relevant AU organs where it states that “[w]hen a situation arises in a State 
Party that may affect its democratic political institutional arrangements or the le-
gitimate exercise of power, the Peace and Security Council shall exercise its re-
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sponsibilities in order to maintain the constitutional order in accordance with rele-
vant provisions of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Se-
curity Council of the African Union”.120 This AU claim for intervention is not 
however a novelty in the African region.121 Article 11 (2) (b) (ii) of the SADC Pro-
tocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation includes “a military coup or 
other threat to the legitimate authority of a State” among the situations that justify 
enforcement action by the Organ. Article 25 of the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to 
the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping 
and Security provides that the Mechanism shall be activated in the event of, inter 
alia, an “overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected govern-
ment”, while the ECCAS Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council of 
Central Africa contains an almost identical provision, which however refers to the 
“constitutional institutions” of a member State, and not to a “democratically elec-
ted government” (Article 25). Finally, the CEMAC Pact on Non-aggression, Soli-
darity and Mutual Assistance provides for a duty of mutual assistance, inter alia, 
“devant un cas de trouble grave de nature à perturber la stabilité intérieure, à re-
mettre en cause la légalité républicaine et à porter préjudice au bon fonctionnement 
de la Communauté dans son ensemble” (Article 4). All the above provisions do not 
seek to impose a certain government, but rather aim to preserve the existing ones 
from unconstitutional seizures of power. The difference between the AU, SADC, 
CEMAC and ECCAS Protocols on the one hand and the ECOWAS Protocol on 
the other is that the former do not expressly require that the ousted government be 
democratic or democratically elected and might thus be interpreted as prioritizing 
regime security over human security.122 On the other hand, the SADC Protocol is 
the only one that expressly submits the intervention to the Security Council’s au-
thorization (Article 11 (3) (d)).123 
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The Great Lakes Regional Programme of Action for the Promotion of Democ-
racy and Good Governance includes a Protocol on Democracy and Good Govern-
ance, the preamble of which recalls that “the accumulated deficits in the matter of 
democratization are at the origin of the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region”. Arti-
cle 2 of the Protocol also commits the member States to comply with democratic 
constitutional principles, such as the separation of powers, accession to power 
through regular, free, fair and transparent elections and the prohibition of uncon-
stitutional change and any other undemocratic means of acceding to or maintaining 
power, the public participation in decision-making process in accordance with de-
mocratic principles and decentralization, the decentralization of power at all levels 
of governments, the non-partisan character of the defence and security forces, the 
secular nature of the State and its institutions, the promotion of national unity of 
the State and its institutions, the prohibition of any ethnic, religious, racial, gender 
or regional discrimination, the equality of men and women, including through af-
firmative action policies, the political pluralism, the freedom of association, assem-
bly and peaceful demonstration, the freedom of expression, the freedom of move-
ment and the prohibition of forced exile.  
However, nowhere in the Great Lakes Pact is the use of military force envisaged 
as a possible tool to enforce this commitment to democracy. The Protocol on 
Non-aggression and Mutual Defence only focuses on the obligation of the member 
States not to support directly or indirectly armed groups engaged in the unconsti-
tutional overthrow of the government of another State, be it democratic or not 
(Article 4 (5)), and does not make reference to the use of force in order to restore a 
democratic government in another State. On the other hand, Article 23 (6) of the 
Pact states that “[a] Member State that is unable or unwilling to honor its obliga-
tions under this Pact [including those on democracy] shall account for its failure 
before the Summit which will determine the consequences of such failure”.124 More 
specifically, Article 48 of the above mentioned Democracy and Good Governance 
Protocol provides that “[i]n the event of threats to democracy and a beginning of 
its breakdown by whatever process and in the event of massive violations of hu-
man and peoples’ rights in a Member State, the Summit shall convene an extraordi-
nary session in order to adopt urgent and appropriate measures to put an end to 
the situation”. It is not clear what “urgent and appropriate measures” the Summit 
could adopt, and in particular whether it could decide enforcement action. The 
preferable answer seems to be negative, if one considers that, under Article 28 of 
the Pact, the member States commit themselves to settle their disputes peacefully 
“within the framework of the Conference’s Regional Follow-up Mechanism” and 
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no mention is made of coercive measures. Furthermore, the list of sanctions that 
the Conference might adopt in case of threats or breakdown of democracy only 
includes non-military measures, such as the refusal to support the candidatures to 
elective positions in international organizations presented by the member State 
concerned, the refusal to hold any meeting of the International Conference in the 
member State concerned and the suspension of the member State concerned in all 
bodies of the Conference: if an “action” is needed, the matter must be referred to 
the UN and AU “in accordance with established procedures” (Article 49 of the 
Democracy and Good Governance Protocol). This is in contrast with other Afri-
can regional and sub-regional organizations that have set up collective mechanisms 
to deal with violations of the treaty regime and with threats to regional peace and 
security also through military means, if necessary.125  
6. Conclusions 
The Martinican writer and psychiatrist Frantz Fanon once famously noted that 
Africa is shaped like a revolver and the Congo is its trigger.126 One of the purposes 
of the Great Lakes Pact, and of the Protocol on Non-aggression in particular, is to 
disable that trigger and create conditions of sustainable peace in the Great Lakes 
Region. The Protocol is permeated by an evident disfavor towards non-State 
armed groups: it includes them among the perpetrators of aggression, it allows self-
defence against armed attacks by non-State actors and it upgrades whatsoever sup-
port to armed groups from unlawful intervention in another State’s internal affairs 
to violation of the prohibition of the use of force. States parties are also expressly 
required to adopt measures against armed groups, and in particular to apprehend, 
intercept and disarm those operating from within their territory. The reasons for 
such disfavor are easy to understand if one considers that the presence of insur-
gents and militias has long destabilized the Great Lakes Region and continues to 
threaten the peace process. 
Another trademark of the Great Lakes Protocol is its use of en vogue catch-
phrases like “human security” and “responsibility to protect” in the context of ius 
ad bellum. In fact, the Protocol is probably the first security treaty to expressly re-
fer to the responsibility to protect. Article 4 (8), however, is problematic where it 
appears to allow armed intervention to protect populations even without the con-
sent of the territorial State: this author has argued that the provision can and 
should be harmonized with the Charter and interpreted as providing for a case of 
intervention by “pre-emptive” invitation if certain grave situations occur. If this 
conclusion is correct, the significance of the Protocol as well as of other African 
treaties containing similar provisions (e.g., Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive 
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Act) is not, as often argued, that they contain regional rules on the use of force that 
depart from the universal ones, but rather that, by concluding them, the African 
States have chosen to relinquish part of their sovereignty so to allow external in-
terventions on their territory if massive human rights violations are perpetrated. It 
is therefore more a political change of attitude than a legal innovation. 
The Great Lakes Protocol also conforms to existing ius ad bellum in that, unlike 
other African treaties, it correctly does not envisage the use of force in order to re-
store an ousted democratic government, but refers any action to that purpose to 
the AU and to the UN. The only Protocol provisions that cannot be reconciled 
with existing law are those that allow self-defence not only in reaction to an armed 
attack, but also in the case of “failure […] to intercept and disarm members of an 
armed group pursued by the defence and security forces of a Member State” (Arti-
cle 8 (10)) and in order to “restore and maintain the peace, security, stability, and 
development of the Great Lakes Region” (Article 6 (3)). These provisions go well 
beyond the narrow limits under which self-defence is permissible under Article 51 
of the UN Charter: as the Charter prevails under Article 10 (3) of the Protocol and 
Article 103 of the Charter, they are inoperative and cannot confer any further right 
to the States parties. 
Although the Great Lakes Non-aggression Protocol is not faultless, it is now es-
sential that the ratification process is completed and that the States parties fully and 
promptly implement it (as well as the rest of the Pact), for instance by concluding 
the bilateral arrangements envisaged in Article 8 (7), by establishing mechanisms 
for control, surveillance and management of common borders (Article 7) and by 
adopting common policies and strategies in order to eradicate the proliferation of 
small arms and light weapons in the region as required by Article 9. Whether this 
will be enough to prevent the pathological recurrence of armed conflicts in the 
Great Lakes Region, only time will tell. 
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